OUR VIEW · OPINION中文

Alnylam: our view and what our model says about 2030

By · AI-assisted, human-reviewed and edited · · 9 sources · Fact-checked · 12 min read (42 min with all details)

Our view

Alnylam is now a profitable one-drug company: Amvuttra, its heart and nerve drug for transthyretin (TTR) amyloidosis, brings in nearly 80% of revenue, and the stock has fallen about 63% in a year as the heart launch has grown more slowly than promised; in October management said it isn't satisfied with demand. On our inputs, about 95% of runs beat the hurdle, because the price implies a much weaker launch than either we or analysts expect. That doesn't mean the stock is safe: our model can only show the risks we put in it, and it assumes the multiple recovers, few replays have sales stalling, and cash builds up. The market may be pricing something harsher. The main risk is a hit to the franchise itself (a safety signal or being pushed behind cheap generic pills), which in the simulation drops the median to about $281.

Price, Nov 5 close
$156.66
Hurdle, end-2030
$224
Median value, end-2030
$370
P10–P90 range, end-2030
$250–$540
Simulations beating hurdle
95%
Harsher read, median
$200

Prices: official close, Yahoo and CNBC, Nov 5, 2026 · Company data: 10-Q, Sep 30, 2026 · What these numbers mean

Market data as of the Nov 5, 2026 close ($156.66). The hurdle and the probabilities depend on that price. Values per share at Dec 31, 2030, undiscounted, from 50,000 simulations. Harsher read: exit at 2.3x sales, with no value for unproven drugs; see Why our range sits so far above the price.

Snapshot at the Nov 5, 2026 close

Enterprise value
$18.4B†
Price/sales
4.2×
P/E
7.9×*
Price/FCF
26.0×
Revenue growth
+56%
Net cash
$2.6B†

Our calculation from the company's filings (latest: 10-Q for the quarter to Sep 30, 2026, filed Oct 29, 2026); not investment advice. Revenue, earnings and cash flow: 12 months to Sep 30, 2026. Price $156.66 (official close, Yahoo and CNBC); 133.9 million shares (common shares on the cover page of the 10-Q filed Oct 29, 2026). n/m = not meaningful (e.g. negative earnings). * Trailing P/E includes a $1.9B income-tax benefit in the 12 months to Sep 30, 2026. † Debt excludes ~$1.735B of royalty and development-funding liabilities to Blackstone, which the company reports separately.

Earlier versions

VersionPrice usedHorizonMedian valueP10–P90Beat chance
Nov 5, 2026THIS VERSION $156.66 (Nov 5, 2026) end-2030$370$250–$54095%

No earlier versions yet. Each row is frozen as published: when we update this view, the previous numbers stay here.

Version 1.23 · Nov 5, 2026

Editors hold this stock, and also Arrowhead, which this article mentions. Updated for the Q3 2026 results. Market data as of the Nov 5, 2026 close ($156.66); market value $21.0B on 133.9M shares (Q3 10-Q cover). Including options and stock units on the treasury method (about 137M diluted shares): $21.4B. Latest filings: the 10-K for 2025 and the Q3 2026 10-Q.

Labels used below: Fact (filings or market data), Company (management claims), Analyst (named or consensus views), Our view (our own reasoning). Each section ends with a confidence level.

Simulation result (value per share at Dec 31, 2030, undiscounted; 50,000 simulations):

  • P10 $250 · P50 $370 · P90 $540 (middle half $304–$455; mean $390).
  • Hurdle $224 (the end-2030 price that earns 9% a year from today): 95% of simulations beat it (about +23% a year at the median). The next section explains why that doesn’t mean the stock is safe.
End-2030 value per share (undiscounted) P10 P25 P50 (median) P75 P90 Mean Chance to beat the hurdle Chance of a loss
Without pipeline bonus values $200 $250 $310 $385 $470 $330 84% 2.1%

What would move the result

  • Upside:
    • Faster new patient starts in 2028–29 (the fastest fifth of replays): the median would move to about $429.
    • A higher stock-market valuation level in 2030: the median would move to about $428.
    • A smaller yearly net-price cut: the median would move to about $410.
    • A positive nucresiran heart trial by end-2030: the median would move to about $391.
  • Downside:
    • A franchise impairment (about 8% of replays): the median would move to about $281.
    • New patient starts following analysts’ slower path instead of ours: the median would move to about $361.
    • Higher patient attrition: the median would move to about $338.

Why our range sits so far above the price

Almost every replay ends above today’s price, and the middle case is more than twice it. That doesn’t mean the stock is safe, and readers shouldn’t take it that way. Our model can only show the risks we put in it.

Four settings help explain the gap. It assumes the multiple recovers from about 3 times next year’s sales to about 4 times at the median, based on Alnylam’s own history; in our limited historical test, an approximation of this method overpredicted biotech sales multiples. It has few replays with sales stalling: our median for 2027 already sits below analysts’ (about $6.1 billion against $6.6 billion), but sales still grow by about half from 2026 to 2030, and even the weakest tenth of replays ends 2030 at about $6.6 billion, above this year’s level. It lets about $8 billion of net cash build up by 2030, even after the new $1.0 billion buyback. And it adds value for drugs not yet proven, about $54 a share at the median.

The market may be pricing what those settings leave out: that new patient starts stay slow, since management says converting doctors’ interest into starts is taking longer than it hoped; that the 340B payment cut, final from January, and tighter Medicare Advantage plans hurt price and access in ways nobody can size yet; that generic tafamidis from 2031 narrows the room for a premium-priced drug; and that buyers won’t pay growth-biotech multiples for a company so dependent on its TTR franchise, with its royalty rising. Biotechs that fell this far have often stayed down: in a rough sample of 51 falls of 50% or more in a year (2011-22), 37% were lower four years later, and that sample leaves out companies no longer listed.

Harsher reads, none our main result Median, end-2030 Beat $224 End below today’s price
Our model as it stands $370 95% 0.2%
No value for unproven drugs $310 84% 2.1%
Exit at today’s multiple, no value for unproven drugs $250 75% 0.7%
Exit at 2.3x sales, as for companies near patent expiry, no value for unproven drugs $200 26% 8.9%

Fixing the exit multiple also removes the replays where it falls below today’s level, which is why fewer end below today’s price in the third row than in the second.

One way to end 2030 at today’s price: about $5.9 billion of 2031 sales, a little above this year’s level, at 2.3 times, with the cash intact and no pipeline value. To earn 9% a year at today’s multiple, Alnylam needs about $7.3 billion of 2031 sales; our middle case has about $8.5 billion. Readers can judge how likely each looks.

Our view in brief

  1. Alnylam guides to about $5.3–5.7B of revenue in 2026, nearly 80% from Amvuttra, so the case rests on one drug’s launch. It expects TTR sales at the low end of $4.2–4.5B.
  2. Amvuttra is growing fast but more slowly than promised: 2026 TTR guidance was cut by $200M in July, added US demand slowed in Q3 ($81M, after $129M in Q2), and cheaper stabilizers (generic in the EU now, the US in 2031) hold first-line patients. Medicare Advantage limits and a 340B payment cut, final from January, add pressure in 2027. The stock fell 25% on the Q3 results.
  3. The finances are sound: $3.6B of cash, positive cash flow and a new $1.0B buyback. Royalties of up to 30% paid to Sanofi on Amvuttra hold back margins, and a $1.95B one-off tax benefit makes Q3 profit look far larger than it was.
  4. Our simulation gives a median end-2030 value of $370 a share (P25 $304, P75 $455; mean $390) against a $224 hurdle; 95% of replays beat it. The exit multiple uses Alnylam’s own valuation history since 2024, faded toward peers.
  5. The main risk is a hit to the franchise itself. If new patients follow the slower path analysts imply, the result falls but the median still clears the hurdle. The market is plainly pricing something harsher than our model does, and we can’t rule that out.
  6. Watch the response to the 340B cut, 2027 guidance in mid-February, and the 2028–30 trial results for nucresiran, mivelsiran and zilebesiran that decide whether Alnylam is more than a one-drug company.

1. The business in one paragraph

Alnylam makes money mainly from one product, Amvuttra, an injection every three months that switches off the liver’s production of TTR, the protein behind ATTR amyloidosis. That is why our model is built almost entirely around Amvuttra’s US patient numbers and net price. The full facts are in Alnylam’s Long View → /stocks/alny/long-view/

The facts behind this

Fact:

  • 2025 revenue was $3.71B (+65%), including $2.99B of product sales (+81%).
  • In Q3 2026, revenue was $1.46B, of which Amvuttra was $1.13B (78%), and 80% of Amvuttra sales were in the US.
  • The rest comes from three smaller rare-disease drugs (Onpattro, Givlaari, Oxlumo), royalties on two partner drugs (Novartis’s Leqvio for cholesterol and Sanofi’s Qfitlia for haemophilia) and partner R&D payments, mainly from Roche.

Confidence: high.

2. Where growth comes from (3–5 years)

Our model treats growth to 2030 as one question: how many new US heart patients start Amvuttra each quarter, and how many stay on it. The next-generation drugs arrive only around 2028–2031, so they enter the model as bonus values weighted by their odds. Nucresiran matters mainly for margins, because it carries no Sanofi royalty.

The facts behind this

Drivers, in order of how much they matter for 2030:

  • Amvuttra in ATTR cardiomyopathy (ATTR-CM). US approval came in March 2025 on HELIOS-B, the only silencer trial to show a mortality benefit. Company: about 80% of new patient starts are now first-line. The early boost from patients switching off stabilizers is over. Added US demand was $81M in Q3, after $129M in Q2. Company (Q3 call): new-prescription share is stable at above 30% and total prescription share is 24%, but “converting into patient starts is taking longer than we’d hoped”; more than 2,000 new prescribers have tried it, about a third of active prescribers, and many have few such patients. Management doesn’t expect growth to accelerate in Q4.
  • Geographic expansion. Fact: Japan, the EU, the UK, Brazil and Canada have approved it, and BeOne will distribute it in China if approved. Ex-US Amvuttra was $222M in Q3 (+9% from Q2).
  • Nucresiran, a twice-yearly next-generation TTR silencer. Company: launch in nerve disease (PN) by 2028 and heart disease (CM) by 2030. It matters for margins more than for volume, because Alnylam pays Sanofi royalties of up to 30% on Amvuttra but none on nucresiran (Fact, 10-Q).
  • Royalties and partner payments: total royalty revenue was $94.7M in Q3, driven mainly by Leqvio; other sources include Qfitlia, and cemdisiran (Regeneron; FDA decision in November 2026). Roche shares zilebesiran costs and can pay milestones; $830M of the Roche deal value is still to be recognised.

Size of the market. Independent estimates are of little use.

  • Syndicated market-research reports put the whole ATTR market at roughly $7.5–11B by 2030.
  • Branded ATTR drugs already sell at about a $13B annual rate: Pfizer’s tafamidis about $7.1B, Amvuttra about $4.5B, BridgeBio’s Attruby about $1.0B (Q3 2026 figures annualised).
  • Company: about 200,000 US ATTR-CM patients (500,000 worldwide), with about 80% untreated. The CEO expects about 75,000 treated US patients across all drugs by 2030, and says a third of category prescriptions at current pricing would meet Alnylam’s goals.
  • Analyst (BMO, per secondary reports we could not verify): the second-line pool was “exhausted sooner than expected”, so the upside depends on first-line starts.
2024 2025 2026E 2027E 2030 (company target)
Total revenue ($B) 2.25 3.71* 5.44 (cons.) 6.57 (cons.) ≥11.3 (25%+ CAGR)
Growth 65% ~46% ~21%
TTR product sales ($B) 1.22 2.49 4.2–4.5 (guide; CFO: low end) n/a
Adj. EPS (consensus) 5.08 (actual) 22.61 (includes the Q3 tax benefit) 11.15

*Includes a one-time $300M Roche milestone in Q3 2025. Consensus: S&P Global via StockAnalysis, 28–30 analysts, Nov 5, 2026; 2027 was $6.92B before the Q3 results. Long-range consensus (2028–30) is thin (one aggregator showed about $8.25B for 2028 before the results). Asked about the 25%+ growth goal on the Q3 call, management expressed conditional confidence, resting on that prescription share, current pricing and growth outside the US. For the later years, our simulation in section 7 builds revenue from new US patients, dropouts and net price; its median is $8.2B of revenue in 2030.

Track record (Fact). Financial guidance has been mixed.

  • The 2025 product guidance was raised twice, ending at $2.95–3.05B, and the result was $2.99B.
  • The 2026 TTR guidance of $4.4–4.7B, set in January and reiterated in April, was cut by $200M to $4.2–4.5B in July. In October the CFO said sales would land at the low end. 2027 product guidance moves from January to mid-February, because of the 340B rule.
  • Company: Alnylam met all its “P5x25” five-year goals.
  • Product timelines have mostly held: the CM approval and the three Phase 3 starts in 2025 (Company) came on schedule.
  • The HELIOS-B readout slipped from early 2024 to June 2024 when the analysis plan was changed (Feb 15, 2024).
  • Two items count against it. In 2024 it changed the HELIOS-B analysis plan four months before the readout (the company said it followed regulator discussions, and the trial met its primary endpoint), and the first results from the mivelsiran Phase 2 in CAA (a brain amyloid disease) are not due until 2028.

Pipeline quality, in place of backlog (Our view). Alnylam has no backlog. The equivalent question is how much of the 2030 forecast rests on drugs not yet approved. The answer is very little: nucresiran PN would only be in its first years. The forecast stands or falls on Amvuttra’s uptake curve.

Confidence: medium (consensus beyond 2027 not visible).

3. The edge (moat)

The RNAi platform edge is real and durable. In ATTR-CM itself, though, Amvuttra is a premium-priced add-on fighting cheaper oral pills, and its edge there is narrower than the platform’s. In our model the narrower edge shows up as a chance that payers or a rival push Amvuttra to second line, and as extra weight on analysts’ slower path for new patients.

The facts behind this

Why it wins (Fact/Company):

  • Six approved RNAi drugs, 20+ years of data, liver-targeting chemistry that allows infrequent dosing, and in-house manufacturing, including a new enzymatic process used for nucresiran.
  • Amvuttra is the only drug approved for both the nerve and heart forms. It lowers TTR by about 87% with dosing every three months.
  • The failure of AstraZeneca/Ionis’s eplontersen (Wainua) in its heart outcomes trial (July 2026) leaves Amvuttra as the only silencer with positive heart outcomes data.

Signs the edge is narrowing:

  • Price. US list price is about $477,000 a year for Amvuttra, against about $268,000 for tafamidis and $245,000 for Attruby (press and drug-database reports; approximate).
  • Benefit on top of stabilizers is unproven. HELIOS-B was not powered for patients already on tafamidis, though a prespecified subgroup analysis at ESC 2026 showed consistent benefit with or without it (the company says it wasn’t powered for that). In eplontersen’s trial, adding a silencer to a stabilizer showed no effect.
    • 57% of CARDIO-TTRansform patients were on tafamidis at baseline, and about 81% by the end once in-trial starts are included, against 40% at baseline in HELIOS-B.
    • Adding eplontersen to a stabilizer gave a rate ratio of 1.14 (95% CI 0.85–1.53) in a prespecified subgroup analysis, which is hypothesis-generating. Eplontersen is a different drug, a monthly antisense.
  • Analyst (Guggenheim, after the July cut): the cut raises doubts about the size of the opportunity, with three possible explanations: a thinner commercial runway, a pricing problem, or a shift toward stabilizers.
  • Payer limits (Company, Q3 call). UnitedHealth made first-line Amvuttra more restrictive in Medicare Advantage from Oct 1, though existing patients aren’t affected and exceptions exist. The 10-Q says certain Medicare Advantage plans have made Amvuttra non-preferred, with step therapy.
  • 340B (Fact, 10-Q). A “meaningful portion” of US Amvuttra units is bought under 340B. On Nov 4, CMS finalized a cut in Medicare payment for 340B-bought drugs for 2027, from ASP plus 6% to ASP minus 28% (the proposal in the 10-Q was minus 33.4%); some hospital types are exempt, and court challenges are possible. The rule changes what hospitals receive; it doesn’t directly set Alnylam’s price. Before the final rule, the CFO said price could move either way, depending on what health systems do, and volume was unknown.
  • Patient cost (Our view). Oral stabilizers fall under Medicare Part D, where out-of-pocket costs are capped at $2,100 in 2026. Amvuttra is doctor-administered under Part B, with 20% coinsurance unless the patient has supplemental cover.
  • Tafamidis is going generic: the EU approved a generic on Sep 18, 2026 (Tafamidis Accord, for hereditary ATTR-CM per the EMA page; most patients have the wild-type form), and settlements allow US generics from June 1, 2031 (subject to the outcome of other litigation, including Apotex).

Share by value (Our estimate): Amvuttra had about a third of Q3 2026 branded ATTR drug sales (Amvuttra $1.13B, tafamidis $1.77B, Attruby $0.25B).

Drug Company How it works, dosing Approved for Latest quarter Exclusivity / status
Amvuttra Alnylam Silencer; injection every 3 months (Part B) PN + CM $1,131M (Q3’26) US CM orphan exclusivity to Mar 2032; patents to 2036
Vyndaqel/Vyndamax Pfizer Stabilizer; daily pill (Part D) CM $1.77B (Q3’26, +11%) US generics Jun 2031 (subject to other litigation); EU generic (hereditary ATTR-CM label) approved Sep 2026
Attruby/Beyonttra BridgeBio (Bayer ex-US) Stabilizer; twice-daily pill CM $253M US (Q3’26, +14% from Q2) Growing mainly in first-line patients
Wainua AstraZeneca/Ionis Antisense silencer; monthly self-injection PN only n/a CM Phase 3 missed (Jul 9, 2026)
Nex-z Intellia/Regeneron One-time gene edit Phase 3 (MAGNITUDE) — Holds imposed Oct 29, 2025 after a grade 4 liver event; the patient later died (reported; not confirmed in Intellia releases we saw). FDA lifted the holds Jan 27, 2026 (MAGNITUDE-2, PN) and Mar 2, 2026 (MAGNITUDE, CM)
Depleters (ALXN2220, coramitug) AstraZeneca, Novo Nordisk Antibodies that clear deposits Late-stage trials — Could be added to any of the above

RNAi platform rivals include Arrowhead (an editor holding), Novartis and Ionis. None has an approved TTR RNAi drug.

Confidence: medium.

4. The worst realistic risk

Our model’s central downside case is a plateau, not a collapse, though more severe outcomes remain possible: Amvuttra settles as a second-line or add-on drug while cheap stabilizers keep first-line patients, and the company keeps growing profitably but slowly after 2027. The simulation’s sharpest losses come only from a franchise impairment (section 7).

Survival is not the issue: with $3.6B of cash and securities and positive cash flow, Alnylam could get through a bad year without raising money.

The facts behind this

Our model’s central downside case is a plateau, not a collapse, though more severe outcomes remain possible. Amvuttra settles as a second-line or add-on drug while cheap stabilizers keep first-line patients, prices come under policy pressure, and nucresiran’s heart trial disappoints. That would leave a profitable company growing in single digits after 2027. In the simulation, replays that follow analysts’ slower path for new patients end at a median of about $361 a share, against $390 on our path; a franchise impairment drops it to about $281 (section 7).

Risk How likely (3–5 yrs) How bad Notes
First-line uptake stalls vs stabilizers Medium Severe Already visible in the July cut and Q3’s slower demand. Generic tafamidis (EU now, hereditary label; US from 2031, subject to litigation) widens the price gap.
Pricing/policy (340B, Medicare negotiation, most-favoured-nation pricing, Part B reform) Medium High The 340B cut is the nearest test (section 3). Our view: Amvuttra appears exempt from Medicare negotiation while all its indications are orphan, which is why Alnylam paused plans for a Stargardt disease Phase 3 in October 2022, citing the Inflation Reduction Act (CEO: “pressing the pause button”). The July 2025 budget law (the ORPHAN Cures Act provision) widened the orphan exclusion to drugs with more than one orphan designation, which makes the exemption less fragile. Alnylam has no reported most-favoured-nation pricing deal.
Nucresiran CM fails or slips past 2030 Low–medium High after 2030 The eplontersen result raises the bar on background-stabilizer patients. Alnylam has enlarged TRITON-CM twice in 2026, from 1,250 to about 2,250 patients, the second time because event rates were lower than expected (Company). The 2030 CM launch target was kept.
Government price-reporting probe Low–medium Medium Subpoena received Oct 2025 (see table).
Pipeline beyond TTR disappoints (zilebesiran, mivelsiran) Medium Medium on the multiple, low on 2030 revenue Readouts come in 2028–30.
Commercial leadership gap Medium Low–medium The Chief Commercialization Officer leaves in December; a search firm is helping choose a successor.

Legal and regulatory docket (Fact, Q3 2026 10-Q, Note 12 and Part II Item 1, and press). The 10-Q reports no material loss contingencies accrued at the end of September.

Matter Status Accrued Next date
US Attorney (D. Mass.) subpoena on government price reporting for all four products, incl. distributor fees and discounts Records produced; still engaging None material Not disclosed
University of Texas v. Alnylam (’717 patent, Onpattro) Transferred to D. Mass.; trial set for August 2027 None material Trial Aug 2027
Alnylam/Novartis v. Cipla (generic Leqvio application) Filed D. Del. March 2026 n/a Not disclosed
Alnylam v. Cipla (generic Amvuttra application) Filed D. Del. Sep 16, 2026; the stay date isn’t disclosed n/a Not disclosed
Shareholder-firm “investigations” after the July fall Plaintiff-firm announcements only; the 10-Q reports no such suit, and our web search on Nov 5 found no complaint Not reported Watch for a filing

Dependence map (Fact unless marked). Customer and contract terms are in Alnylam’s Long View → /stocks/alny/long-view/

  • Customers. One US distributor (“Distributor A”) was 45% of 2025 gross revenue. Our view: the real dependence is on Medicare, given that ATTR-CM patients are mostly 75 and older; the Medicare share is not disclosed.
  • Blackstone also receives 75% of Leqvio commercial milestones. Its funding is secured on vutrisiran and zilebesiran intellectual property and can be terminated on a change of control.
  • Suppliers and licences. Arbutus licenses the lipid-nanoparticle technology used in Onpattro.

Product-programme delays vs plan

Program Plan Status
Nucresiran CM launch By 2030 Kept, despite a larger trial
Nucresiran PN launch By 2028 Topline data 2028 (company)
Mivelsiran CAA (cAPPricorn-1) Phase 2 started Jul 2024 Enrolled Jul 2026; initial results 2028
ALN-HTT02 (brezosiran) data H2 2026 Delivered Oct 23, 2026 (positive)
ALN-6400 and ALN-2232 data H2 2026 ALN-6400 healthy-volunteer data in December; its HHT patient data and ALN-2232 moved to February 2027
ALN-4324 Phase 2 start H1 2026 Unconfirmed in what we read (open question)

Survival check (Fact): passes easily. Cash and securities were $3.59B at the end of September, operating cash flow was positive ($738M in nine months), and the $500M credit line is undrawn. Debt is $362.8M of convertible notes due Sep 2027, which we expect to be repaid in cash because the conversion price of $286 is above the share price, and $661.3M due Sep 2028 (conversion price $670). The board authorised a $1.0B buyback in November, with about $500M expected by year-end and the rest in 2027; Alnylam can change or stop it at any time (8-K). Company: the board believes the share price “does not fully reflect Alnylam’s intrinsic value”, and buying back shares runs alongside continued investment in the launch and pipeline (release, Nov 4). Alnylam could get through a bad year without raising money.

Confidence: medium–high.

5. Financial quality (read the notes)

Latest quarter (Q3 2026), first nine months of 2026 and trailing 12 months (TTM) to Sep 30, 2026; full years 2024–25 from the 10-K for FY2025. TTM figures and ratios are our calculation from these filings.

The profits are real and cash-backed, but each new dollar of Amvuttra sales earns less as the Sanofi royalty climbs toward 30%, and a one-off $1.95B tax benefit flatters Q3 profit. Our model takes the royalty at about 28% of Amvuttra sales. The full facts are in Alnylam’s Long View → /stocks/alny/long-view/

The facts behind this
2024 2025 Nine months 2026 Q3 2026
Product gross margin (after royalties paid) 81.4% 77.3% 75.2% 72.0%
Adj. (non-GAAP) operating margin 4.2% ~23%* ~28% ~29%
Stock-based pay ($M) 272 348 236 80
Free cash flow ($M) −43 465 612 271

Source: 10-K for FY2025 (2024 and 2025 columns) and Q3 2026 10-Q (nine months and Q3); margins and free cash flow are our calculation from them, with 2026’s adjusted margin as operating income plus stock pay. *2025 includes the $300M Roche milestone. Without it, the margin was about 16%.

Standard checks:

  1. Revenue vs gross profit (10-K royalty terms; Q3 2026 10-Q). Gross profit is growing more slowly than sales because royalties paid on Amvuttra rise with sales: they reach 30% on everything above $1.5B, and they reset each January. Product sales rose 76% in the first nine months, while cost of goods sold rose 112%. This will keep pressing on margins until nucresiran replaces Amvuttra, though the rise in the blended rate slows as sales grow, because the top tier is flat at 30%.
  2. Receivables vs revenue (10-K; Q3 2026 10-Q; our calculation). Receivables rose 40% in nine months to $1.08B. Measured on quarterly revenue, collection time was about 68 days, against about 65 at the end of 2025.
  3. Inventory (Q3 2026 10-Q and call). Current inventory was $106M, against $83M at year-end. Distributors’ stock rose from 19 to 21 days in Q3, adding $17M to US sales, and the CFO expects inventory and price to be headwinds in Q4.
  4. Stock pay vs free cash flow (our calculation from the 10-K and 10-Qs). TTM free cash flow is about $806M and TTM stock pay about $307M, so roughly 38% of free cash flow is matched by stock pay. Exercises of stock options and other types of equity brought in $250M, net, in 2025 (10-K), which shows up as dilution.
  5. “Adjusted” definitions (earnings releases; proxy, DEF 14A Apr 6, 2026). Non-GAAP figures exclude stock pay, gains and losses on equity investments, and in 2025 a $42.5M convertible-note inducement loss. The definition is stable. The 2025 bonus metric for non-GAAP operating income was measured before the bonus itself (proxy). It made no difference in 2025: actual was $850M against a $550M maximum.
  6. Estimate catch-ups (10-K; Q3 2026 10-Q and call).
    • 2025 product revenue included a $48.8M release of prior-year rebate reserves (about 1.6% of product sales). Releases in the first nine months of 2026 were small ($7.0M), and Q3 included about $10M of one-time Medicaid-related price adjustment (Company).
    • Rebate reserves rose to $557M from $426M. Gross-to-net discounts are about 23% (our calculation for the first nine months), up from about 20% in 2024.
    • Estimates on the Blackstone liabilities moved against Alnylam: the implied rate on the Leqvio royalty sale rose from 10% to 14% and on the vutrisiran funding from 46% to 51%. That raises future interest expense.
  7. Capitalised costs (Q3 2026 10-Q). These are minimal. Capital spending is rising ($126M in nine months, against $35M a year earlier) for the manufacturing build-out.
  8. Goodwill vs equity (Q3 2026 10-Q). No goodwill. Book equity rose to $3.60B, largely because of the $1.95B tax release, after a $4.16B accumulated deficit.
  9. Material weaknesses (10-K for FY2025). None. PwC gave a clean controls opinion, and the Q3 10-Q reports disclosure controls effective at the end of September. Its critical audit matter was the Leqvio royalty liability.
  10. Accounting-policy changes (10-K; Q3 2026 10-Q).
  • Alnylam early-adopted ASU 2025-07 in Q4 2025, back-dated to Jan 1, 2025. The Blackstone development funding moved from a fair-value derivative to debt-like accounting, which credited $271.5M to equity in one step.
  • The result is steadier earnings but higher interest expense: $84M in Q3.
  • The cash-flow statement adds back $227M of “non-cash interest” for the first nine months, but royalty and funding payments then flow through operating cash flow.
  1. Receivable sales, factoring and royalty monetisation (Q3 2026 10-Q).
  • No factoring is disclosed. The royalty and funding liabilities are carried at $1.74B in total. The fair value of the 2020 Leqvio royalty sale is $2.03B, and of the vutrisiran and zilebesiran funding $599M.
  • Our view: fair value exceeds book by about $0.9B. The fair values are Level 3 estimates that rose largely because expected Leqvio and Amvuttra sales rose, and Alnylam keeps the other 50% of Leqvio royalties and 99% of Amvuttra net sales before Sanofi and other royalties.
  • Section 6 counts the liabilities as debt at book ($1.74B); at fair value, EV would be about $21.0B.
  1. One-offs (our calculation). The $300M Roche milestone in Q3 2025 has now left the TTM figures, and it makes Q3 2026’s total revenue growth (+17%) look weak against product sales growth (+52%). The $1.95B tax release lifts Q3 and TTM net income: Q3 was $2.17B.
  2. Tax (10-K; Q3 2026 10-Q). Alnylam released $1.95B of its valuation allowance in Q3, so GAAP tax now moves toward normal rates; cash tax stays low while tax losses last. Our view: the rate should rise toward about 20% by 2030 as those losses are used up. Consensus EPS growth partly depends on how fast that happens.
The share-count bridge: about 139M shares all-in

Share-count bridge (awards at Dec 31, 2025, except the CEO special PSU; shares from the Q3 10-Q cover)

Layer Shares (M) Note
Basic shares outstanding 133.9 Single class of stock; no warrants
+ Options (3.49M, average strike $143) +0.3 Treasury method at $157; 3.5M gross
+ RSUs and PSUs +2.5 Gross; tax sales reduce the net
= Diluted at $157 ~136.7
+ 2027 notes (conversion $286; capped call to $424) +1.3 Out of the money; cash settlement likely
+ 2028 notes (conversion $670; capped call to $838) +1.0 Far out of the money
+ CEO special PSU +0.03–0.11 (27,687 shares at $500; 55,373 at $600; 110,746 at $800) Requires the applicable $500–800 threshold over 30 consecutive trading days during the final six months of 2029
= Pro forma, all-in ~139

Dilution has run at about 2% a year (shares were 129.3M at the end of 2024 and 133.9M in October 2026). The new $1.0B buyback would retire about 6M shares near today’s price, about 4.5% of the total; our simulation takes it as announced, simply: booked at the start, half at today’s price and half 9% higher.

Confidence: high on facts, medium on interpretation.

6. Valuation today

After a fall of about 63% in a year, Alnylam trades at about 3.1× next year’s sales, well below the biotech peer level for its growth and its own multiple since reaching today’s scale. The price therefore implies either a much flatter launch than analysts expect or a permanently lower multiple. Our simulation assumes neither, which is why its median sits well above today’s price.

The facts behind this

Alnylam now trades below a mid-growth profitable biotech. That means about 3.7× this year’s (2026) sales, 3.1× next year’s, and about 14× next year’s adjusted EPS.

Fact/Our calculation: market value is $20.98B. Enterprise value (EV) is about $20.1B: market value minus $3.59B cash, plus $1.01B of convertible notes and $1.74B of royalty and funding liabilities at book.

Company (Nov 5 close) Market value EV/sales (TTM) EV/EBITDA (TTM) Fwd P/E
Alnylam $21.0B 4.1× 20× 22×
Vertex $137.6B 10.4× 26× 28×
argenx $55.0B 8.8× 27× 26×
BridgeBio $14.5B 17.3× neg. n/a
Ionis $6.4B 7.4× neg. n/a

Peer data: StockAnalysis, Nov 5, 2026 (medium confidence; definitions vary). On forward sales, Alnylam is at 3.7× 2026 and 3.1× 2027 consensus.

Against its own history (Our estimate): the stock was $397.65 at the end of 2025 and reached about $480 at its 52-week high, about 9–10× 2026 sales at the time. It closed at $232.40 the day before the Q3 results and $174.00 the day after, and $156.66 is the lowest close in a year. By quarter, on daily-average prices, the multiple of next-four-quarter sales was about 10.7×, 7.8×, 6.5× and 5.2× from Q4 2025 to Q3 2026, and about 4× so far this quarter (rough, our calculation).

What the price implies (Our view). Today’s EV is about 3.1× 2027 consensus sales. That is below the biotech peer level for Alnylam’s growth (about 4.9× next-year sales, from a 2018–25 study of 32 US biotechs) and far below its own multiple since reaching today’s scale (about 9× in 2024). The market is therefore pricing a much flatter launch than consensus, a permanently lower multiple, or policy damage our model doesn’t size. The simulation assumes none of these in its middle case: its exit multiple sits well above today’s, and sales grow by about half between 2026 and 2030. That is why its median sits so far above today’s price, and why the result depends so much on those two settings.

Analyst views. Consensus is Buy: 30 analysts (S&P Global via StockAnalysis, Nov 5) give 14 Strong Buy, 7 Buy, 9 Hold and no Sell. The average 12-month target is $302 (median $315; range $180–455), about 93% above today’s price.

Simulation against today’s price: Today’s enterprise value (about $20B) is about 3.1× analysts’ 2027 sales, below both the biotech peer level for Alnylam’s growth and its own multiple since reaching today’s scale, so the market is pricing a much flatter launch, a permanently lower multiple or policy damage. Simulation: median end-2030 value $370 a share (P25 $304 and P75 $455, the values a quarter of replays end below and above; mean $390) against a $224 hurdle; 95% of replays beat it and 0.2% end below today’s price. Without the pipeline bonus values the median is $310 and 2.1% lose money.

Named analysts: bulls, the cautious side and short interest
  • The Motley Fool counted 19 Buy ratings among 23 analysts over three months; the gap is a difference in coverage window.
  • After the Q3 results, H.C. Wainwright’s Patrick Trucchio stayed at Buy with $455, Piper Sandler’s Edward Tenthoff at Buy with $410, Oppenheimer’s Kostas Biliouris at Buy with $320, and BMO’s David Lebowitz at Buy with $292.
  • On the cautious side, Stifel cut its rating to Hold with a $225 target on the Q3 results (MarketBeat), and Jefferies holds at $250 from before them. Guggenheim questioned the size of the opportunity after the July cut.
  • William Blair said it could “paint TTR silencers as adding no further benefit on top of TTR stabilizer therapy”.
  • Short interest is 4.9% of the float.

Confidence: medium.

7. Value at end-2030: the simulation

The simulation puts Alnylam’s median end-2030 value at about $370 a share, well above the $224 hurdle. See the harsher reads above. The result rests mainly on the exit multiple, how many new US patients start Amvuttra and the stock market’s valuation level in 2030. The full result table is in the Our view box at the top.

Method: Valued directly at end-2030.

Implied end-2030 multiple: our end-2030 value implies 5.1× (P25–P75 4.2–6.1×) 2031 sales; at the Nov 5 close on the next four quarters: 3.1×. On 2031 earnings: 19.5× (P25–P75 16.4–23.3×); at the Nov 5 close on the next four quarters: 20.5×.

Top 5 assumptions. Our model uses many more inputs; the main ones are shown here.

  1. New US Amvuttra patients: we estimate about 1,200–1,300 start each quarter today, a rough figure from revenue, not a reported one; each replay follows either our view (about 1,200 a quarter) or analysts’ implied dip (about 1,000), weighted 40/60 by past forecast records, so the median is about 1,100 a quarter in 2027–30, with 12–13% of patients lost each year to deaths and dropouts.
  2. US net price falls about 4% a year, and the Sanofi royalty takes about 28% of Amvuttra sales.
  3. The nucresiran heart trial succeeds in 72% of replays (with results in by end-2030 in 43%); the nerve-disease version launches in 85%.
  4. Exit at about 4.1× next-year sales.
  5. Drugs beyond Amvuttra (zilebesiran, mivelsiran, brezosiran, ALN-6400, obesity, ALN-4324) are added as bonus values weighted by their odds; an 8% chance (4–14%) that the franchise is impaired in 2027–30 cuts new starts by half or more, and four further risks are added: the 340B payment cut (65%, a labelled judgment), another US price shock (12%), a further, lasting slowdown in new patients (10%) and a gene-editing rival switching existing patients (only if it launches).

The exit value is next year’s sales times a multiple anchored on Alnylam’s own valuation history. Only the part of its premium over peers that protection does not explain fades, and only while growth lags expectations; protection is counted once, in one step at the exit.

Step by step, at the median: from about 7.4× to about 4.1× next-year sales
  • The own-history anchor (10 quarters, on all economic shares, including today) is about 7.4× next-year sales.
  • Growth slightly below expectations trims it to about 7.0×.
  • Part of the premium over the peer level (about 4.9×) is Amvuttra’s protection; the rest fades toward a protection-matched peer level, bringing it to about 5.4×.
  • The market’s mood, the drug-pricing cycle (now balanced between booms and busts) and event hits take it to about 4.5×.
  • One protection step for the shorter protection left at the exit (none in replays where nucresiran arrives; never below the level of peers near patent expiry, about 2.3× next-year sales) leaves about 4.1×.

The most influential events. Our model includes an 8% chance (4–14%) that the franchise is impaired in 2027–30 (a rival pushing silencers to second line, or payers requiring cheap generic stabilizers first), plus a separate 3% chance of a class-wide safety signal, modelled on Alnylam’s own revusiran setback in 2016. In impaired replays new starts fall by half or more, the exit multiple by about 30%, and the median value to about $281.

Four further risks are included:

  • the 340B payment cut (65%, a labelled judgment: US Amvuttra net revenue about 3% lower for good from 2027, new starts 10% lower for a year; the 340B share of units isn’t disclosed, and the CFO says the effect could go either way);
  • another US price shock (12%; most-favoured-nation pricing or commercial step edits; Amvuttra US revenue about 8% lower for good, with a margin-adjusted multiple);
  • a further, lasting slowdown in new patients, beyond what the base already holds (10%; starts about a fifth lower);
  • a gene-editing rival switching existing patients from about a year after launch (only in the 40% of replays where it launches).

Sensitivities on the same model and inputs:

Variant P50 Chance to beat the hurdle
Neutral economy (no recessions or market swings) $390 96%
Our view only on new patient starts $390 96%
Analysts’ story at 850 new starts a quarter, not 1,000 $360 94%
Costs on their own path instead of tied to revenue $345 90%
Takeover included (7% of replays) $375 95%

Hurdle result: clears. Every variant’s median is above $224.

The facts behind this

P25 means a quarter of the replays end below that value; P75 means a quarter end above it. The hurdle ($224) is today’s $156.66 compounded at 9% a year for 4.15 years. The median is about 66% above it, an implied return of about 23% a year; the weakest tenth of replays (P10 $250) still ends above it; about 5.0% of replays finish below the hurdle.

Our simulation (50,000 replays of the years to Dec 31, 2030) gives a median value of $370 a share, more than twice today’s $157. The middle half of outcomes runs from $305 to $455, and the average is $389. The hurdle, the end-2030 price that would earn 9% a year from today’s price, is $224: 95% of replays beat it and 0.2% end below today’s price.

How the exit multiple is set. The end-2030 value is the next year’s (2031) sales times a multiple anchored on Alnylam’s own valuation since it reached today’s scale (2024 to today, measured against the stock market’s multiple), nudged by how growth compares with what analysts expect today with only the part of its premium that protection does not explain faded toward the biotech peer level (3-year half-life), only while growth lags those expectations, and protection counted once; the median lands at about 4.1× next-year sales (P25–P75 3.3–5.0×), well above today’s level of about 3×, and below its own recent average. Our model does not use earnings multiples for biotechs, because heavy pipeline spending makes them misleading.

How it works, in brief. The model replays the years to Dec 31, 2030 50,000 times, quarter by quarter. Each replay draws new patient starts, dropouts, net price, trial outcomes, rival launches, policy events and the market’s mood, and values the company at the end on its next year’s (2031) sales. Drugs beyond Amvuttra count as bonus values weighted by their odds, not through a higher multiple.

The path behind the median: revenue of $5.4B in 2026, $6.1B in 2027, $7.0B in 2028, $7.7B in 2029 and $8.2B in 2030 (middle half $7.3–9.1B). The net margin reaches about 31% by 2029. The share count rises from about 131M to about 140M through stock pay.

The weakest tenth of replays has about $6.6B of 2030 revenue. One limit: a sales-multiple exit sees margin damage only through these event adjustments. Another: at today’s price almost no replay ends below it, which is a limit of what the model includes, not a claim the stock can’t fall further. The 340B event’s odds and size are a labelled judgment, because the 340B share of units isn’t disclosed.

Confidence: medium on inputs. The result is arithmetic from stated ranges, not a forecast.

8. Management and governance

Management has delivered on science and been less reliable on near-term commercial forecasts; in our model, past forecast records set the weights between our new-patient path and analysts’ slower one. Insider selling shows nothing suspicious in its timing, and the CEO’s special award pays only if the stock reaches $500–800 in 2029.

The facts behind this

Management has delivered on science and has been less reliable on near-term commercial forecasts. Pay is mostly performance-based. With hindsight its targets were easy to beat (Our view; the 2025 revenue target was set before the March 2025 CM approval), and nothing in it rewards returns on capital.

  • Chief Commercialization Officer Tolga Tanguler leaves in December (8-K). Alnylam gives no reason; it calls this a leadership transition for its next phase of growth, and says a search firm is helping choose his successor (release, Nov 4).
  • CEO (Fact). Yvonne Greenstreet (CEO since 2022, previously President and COO) and CFO Jeff Poulton (since 2019). Amy Schulman chairs the board. Two directors left in late 2025: Mike Bonney, a former chair, and Carolyn Bertozzi, who joined Eli Lilly’s board. Stuart Arbuckle (ex-Vertex COO) and Ben Cravatt (Scripps) joined in 2026, when the board grew to eleven.
  • Credibility events (Fact). The 2026 TTR guidance was reiterated in April and cut in July, when the stock fell 28%; in October, management said it would land at the low end, and the stock fell 25%. The HELIOS-B analysis plan was changed shortly before the 2024 readout. On the positive side, 2025 guidance was raised twice and met.
  • What pay rewards (Fact, proxy). The 2025 bonus paid at the 200% maximum.
    • The revenue target was $2.26B (maximum $2.5B), against an actual of $2.99B, and the operating-income goal excluded the bonus cost.
    • PSUs vest on clinical and regulatory milestones plus FY2027 revenue and adjusted operating margin.
    • In March 2026 the CEO received a special PSU award of 55,373 target units (grant-date fair value $18.8M), which pays only if the stock averages $500–800 in the second half of 2029 (3.2–5.1× today’s price).
    • Our view: this award is well aligned with shareholders, while the rest of the pay plan rewards growth with stock pay excluded.
  • Insider activity, Oct 2025–Oct 2026 (Fact, 51 Form 4s). There were no open-market purchases. Sales totalled $54.1M. Of that, $28.6M (53%) was company-mandated sell-to-cover tax sales on vesting, footnoted as such in the Form 4s, and $25.5M (47%) was under Rule 10b5-1 plans. Our view: the timing is not suspicious. The CEO’s biggest sale came close to the top, but it was a pre-set option exercise of a fixed share count, adopted in an open window; all Jan–Jun 2026 plan sales were at $296–370.
  • Voting control (Fact). There is one share class and no controlling holder; the main holders are index and active funds. The board is staggered (three classes), which is a governance minus. Say-on-pay passed with 93%. Director Elliott Sigal drew about 11% against.
Trading-plan sales and their timing (no plan was set up before the July cut)
  • The plan sales included the CEO’s $11.6M (25,650 shares at about $452.7, Nov 12–13, 2025). This was an exercise-and-sale of vested options with strikes of $42–119, expiring Dec 2026 and Mar 2028. The plan was adopted Aug 13, 2025, when the stock was $432.52, and it capped sales at those 25,650 shares, subject to price limits, from Nov 11, 2025 (Q3 2025 10-Q, Item 5). The CEO kept 65,409 shares directly, plus awards.
  • The CSO sold $7.8M under a plan adopted Aug 14, 2025: $5.5M at about $452 on Nov 17, 2025, and $2.3M at $320–370 from Jan to Mar 2026.
  • Other plan sellers: R&D chief Garg ($2.9M under a Nov 20, 2025 plan; $1.4M on Oct 3, 2025 under a Sep 2024 plan), director Pyott ($1.1M on Jun 1, 2026, option exercise and sale) and CHRO McLaughlin ($0.76M, Dec 16, 2025 plan).
  • The 10-Qs report no plan adoptions or terminations in Q1 or Q2 2026, so no plan was set up in the run-up to the July cut. In Q3 one was: Tanguler adopted a plan in August for up to 22,438 shares, with sales from late November 2026.

Confidence: high on facts, medium on interpretation.

9. Signposts

The next tests come quickly: how health systems respond to the 340B cut, preliminary Q4 revenue in January and 2027 guidance in mid-February show whether US demand recovers from the Q3 pace. After that, the story turns on the 2028–30 trial results that decide whether Alnylam is more than a one-drug company.

The signposts: what counts as on track or broken
# Signpost On track Broken When
1 Q4 2026 results TTR at or above about $1.11B, the low end of guidance; added US demand above Q3’s $81M TTR below the guidance range; demand gains shrink again Preliminary Jan 2027; full mid-Feb 2027
1a 340B payment cut (final Nov 4; applies in 2027) Limited effect on price or site of care Price or volume hit, or disruption in ordering From Jan 2027; first read mid-Feb
2 Cemdisiran FDA decision (Regeneron) Approval; royalty stream begins Rejection or delay Nov 2026
3 ALN-6400 (bleeding) and ALN-2232 (obesity) early data Clean proof of mechanism Safety issues or further slips Dec 2026 (ALN-6400, healthy volunteers); Feb 2027
4 2027 guidance Total revenue near consensus ($6.6B) Guide well below consensus Mid-Feb 2027
5 FY2026 10-K No material loss-contingency accrual disclosed on the price-reporting probe; rebate discounts stable around 23% Accrual, or discounts rising Feb 2027
6 Competitor and class data: nex-z progress, depleter Phase 3s, any data for silencers on top of stabilizers Nothing that displaces Amvuttra Strong depleter or gene-edit data 2027–28
7 Nucresiran TRITON-PN topline Positive; PN launch by 2028 Delay 2028
8 Big binary readouts: mivelsiran CAA (2028); TRITON-CM (~2029–30); ZENITH, zilebesiran CVOT (est. Sep 2030) Positive Failure, especially TRITON-CM 2028–30

10. Open questions

The biggest open questions for our model are how far new patient starts have slowed and what the 340B rule does to price and volume. The others concern Medicare exposure, the price-reporting probe, the Cipla challenge and the new buyback.

The full list of open questions
  • How far have new starts slowed? Alnylam doesn’t report them, and our estimate comes from revenue.
  • What will the 340B rule do to net price and volume? The company won’t size it yet.
  • How patients on tafamidis respond to added Amvuttra in practice, and whether Alnylam will run a trial that settles the question.
  • Whether Amvuttra stays exempt from Medicare negotiation, and how big the Medicare share of US sales is.
  • What the price-reporting subpoena is about (distributor fees), and whether it affects past rebate reports.
  • Whether ALN-4324’s Phase 2 started (planned for H1 2026), and why the cAPPricorn-1 readout is now in 2028.
  • What patents the Cipla suit asserts against generic Amvuttra, and when any 30-month stay ends.
  • The long-range consensus for 2028–30, which we could not see.
  • How much of the $1.0B buyback gets done, at what prices, and what follows it.

Pipeline and catalysts (biotech adaptation)

Nucresiran is the programme that matters most for our model: our model gives its nerve-disease launch an 85% chance by end-2030, and its heart trial decides whether the TTR franchise extends beyond the early 2030s without the Sanofi royalty. The rest of the pipeline enters as bonus values weighted by its odds.

The facts behind this

The benchmarks are industry averages for each phase. “Our view” adjusts them for how well validated the target is.

Program Partner Indication Phase Next readout Benchmark PoS* Our view
Nucresiran — hATTR-PN (TRITON-PN, ~125 pts) 3 Topline 2028 55–58% (Ph3→filing) Well above: same target and design logic as approved drugs
Nucresiran — ATTR-CM (TRITON-CM, ~2,250 pts) 3 Event-driven; launch still expected by 2030 (company) 55–58% Above benchmark, but the eplontersen result is a warning
Zilebesiran Roche Uncontrolled hypertension (ZENITH CVOT, ~11,000 pts) 3 Est. Sep 2030 ~51–58% (CV Ph3) Around benchmark; blood-pressure effect modest; safety watched
Mivelsiran — CAA (cAPPricorn-1); Down-syndrome Alzheimer’s 2 Initial results 2028 28.9% (Ph2→Ph3) Below benchmark (CNS)
Brezosiran (ALN-HTT02) Regeneron Huntington’s 1b Data Oct 23, 2026; pivotal to start 2027 52% (Ph1→Ph2) 60–64% mutant HTT lowering at top dose; clean safety (Company)
ALN-6400 — Bleeding (HHT, von Willebrand) 1/2 Dec 2026 (healthy volunteers); Feb 2027 (HHT) 52% —
ALN-2232, ALN-6222 — Obesity 1 Feb 2027 (ALN-2232) 52% Crowded field
Cemdisiran Regeneron (licensed) gMG Filed FDA decision Nov 2026 90.6% (filing→approval) Royalty and milestone to Alnylam
Elebsiran Vir (licensed) Hepatitis delta 3 (Vir) Not disclosed 55–58% Low-to-mid-teen royalties

*BIO/Informa/QLS, Clinical Development Success Rates 2011–2020: Phase 1→2 52.0%, Phase 2→3 28.9%, Phase 3→filing 57.8%, filing→approval 90.6%; overall approval from Phase 1 7.9% (17% for rare-disease drugs, 5.9% for chronic high-prevalence diseases). Citeline 2014–2023: Phase 3 55.0%. The CV Phase 3 figure (50.9%) is from a 2008–19 US dataset.

Patents and loss of exclusivity (Fact, 10-K)

Amvuttra’s US protection runs to March 2032 for heart-disease orphan exclusivity and to 2036 for method patents, so its main heart-disease protection lasts beyond our 2030 horizon. Our model still lets the exit multiple slip toward peers near patent expiry in replays where nucresiran has not arrived.

The facts behind this
Product US exclusivity US patents (selected) EU Comment
Amvuttra New-drug exclusivity to Jun 13, 2027; orphan PN to Jun 2029, CM to Mar 20, 2032 Composition to Nov 2032; methods to Jul 2036 (before term extensions) Data exclusivity to Sep 2030; market and orphan protection to Sep 2032 Alnylam sued Cipla over a generic application in Sep 2026; our model already keeps generics out until 2032 at the earliest
Onpattro — to 2029–32 Orphan to Aug 2028 In decline; UT patent suit
Givlaari Orphan to Nov 20, 2026 to 2033–34 Orphan to Mar 2030
Oxlumo Orphan to Nov 23, 2027 to 2034–35 Orphan to Nov 2030
Leqvio (royalty) — Cipla challenge filed Mar 2026 Blackstone takes 50%
Nucresiran New compound — — No Sanofi royalty; extends the TTR franchise beyond the early 2030s

Sources

Sources (accessed Oct 25 and Nov 5, 2026): 29 filings, releases and data sources
  • Alnylam 10-K FY2025 (Feb 12, 2026)
  • 10-Qs Q1, Q2 and Q3 2026 (Apr 30, Jul 30, Oct 29, 2026)
  • 8-K earnings releases Q4 2025, Q1, Q2 and Q3 2026; 8-K Nov 5, 2026 (buyback, officer departure); company release Nov 4, 2026 (buyback, commercial leadership)
  • 8-K Jan 12, 2026 (event Jan 11; Alnylam 2030, guidance)
  • 8-Ks Dec 3, 2025 (board), Dec 11, 2025 (note repurchase), Mar 4, 2026 (CEO award), May 27, 2026 (board, annual-meeting votes)
  • DEF 14A Apr 6, 2026
  • Forms 4 Oct 2025–Oct 2026 (SEC EDGAR)
  • Q3 2025 earnings release (BioSpace)
  • Q2 2026 call coverage (Investing.com, Motley Fool, Benzinga); Q3 2026 call transcript (Motley Fool, Oct 29, 2026)
  • BioSpace (Jul 31, 2026; Stifel and William Blair notes)
  • Boston Globe (Oct 27, 2022; Stargardt pause)
  • Fierce Pharma, BioPharma Dive and BioSpace (Jul–Oct 2026)
  • AstraZeneca and ESC (CARDIO-TTRansform, Jul–Aug 2026)
  • BridgeBio Q3 2026 10-Q
  • CMS fact sheet on the CY 2027 outpatient final rule (Nov 4, 2026)
  • Pfizer Q3 2026 results
  • Hikma and PharmaVoice (tafamidis settlements)
  • EMA (Tafamidis Accord)
  • Intellia 8-Ks (2026)
  • Alnylam press release Oct 23, 2026 (brezosiran)
  • ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT07223203, NCT07052903, NCT07181109)
  • Yahoo Finance and CNBC (ALNY official closes to Nov 5, 2026)
  • StockAnalysis (ALNY statistics, forecast, analyst actions; peer statistics, Nov 5 close)
  • MarketBeat (Stifel, Oct 29, 2026)
  • Motley Fool (Oct 21, 2026)
  • ad-hoc-news (BofA, Wells Fargo targets)
  • plaintiff-firm notices (Kessler Topaz, Kirby McInerney, Aug 2026)
  • BIO/Informa/QLS (2021) and Citeline success-rate studies
  • Reuters and drug-database list-price reports

About Alnylam Pharmaceuticals: Website (external site)Investor relations (external site)SEC filings (external site)Wikipedia (external site)

Quoting this? You may quote short excerpts under our reuse policy. Please credit WhyMyStockMoved.com and link to this page.

Disclosure: one or more of our editors own shares of companies named in this article (ALNY, ARWR) as a long-term investment. For education only, not investment advice. Full disclaimer.

Spot an error or have a question? · Corrections policy